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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS:
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN
NORTH DAKOTA
Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 660 N.W.2d 909

I.

FACTS

In 1988, fourteen-year-old Monte Hoffner was diagnosed by Dr.
George M. Johnson with Type I diabetes.1 At the time of the diagnosis,
Hoffner was hospitalized for two days, placed on insulin, and instructed that
to manage his diabetes he must test his blood sugar daily. 2 Hoffner next
saw Dr. Johnson in March 1992 to undergo additional testing. 3 On May 28,
1992, Dr. Johnson wrote a letter to Hoffner advising him that he had "lost"
his diabetes, and that he no longer needed to monitor his blood sugar. 4
Upon receipt of the letter, Hoffner discontinued his routine blood sugar
5
testing.
In December 1999, after experiencing flu-like symptoms and weight
loss, Hoffner consulted with doctors and was advised that he was still diabetic. 6 Because his diabetic condition had been left untreated for more than
1. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 2, 660 N.W.2d 909, 911. Type I diabetes is a chronic
disease that occurs when the pancreas produces too little insulin to regulate blood sugar levels
appropriately. Medline Plus Medical Encyclopedia, at http://nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency (last
visited Mar. 24, 2004). Type I diabetes is most common in children and young adults. Children's
Hospital and Regional Medical Center, at http://www.cshcn.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
2. Memorandum on Motions to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, County
of Cass, East Central JudicialDistrict, at I [hereinafter Memorandum], Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003
ND 79, 660 N.W.2d 909 (No. 09-02-C-0026).
3. Id.
4. Hoffner, T 2, 660 N.W.2d at 911. Dr. Johnson's May 28, 1992 letter specifically stated:
Monte, I feel strongly you have had in the past Type II diabetes, rather than Type I
diabetes. ... All this means is that you have "lost" your diabetes because you lost a
lot of weight following your original diagnosis of 1988. The stability of blood sugars
and the very small doses of insulin ever since 1988 suggest you have a very unusual
circumstance, Type II diabetes of youth (which in itself is rare) followed by "cure" of
diabetes because you lost weight and have maintained a high activity level. You
should not need to do blood sugars in the future unless you start to gain a lot of
weight. Please be advised when you grow older that diabetes can "return" if you are
not careful about what you eat and you gain weight. Insofar as I am concerned, there
is absolutely no reason for insurance programs to cause difficulty for you during
enrollment. Again, you have "lost" your Type II diabetes mellitus.
Id.
5. Memorandum at 2, Hoffner (No. 09-02-C-0026).
6. Hoffner, 3, 660 N.W.2d at 911.
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seven years, Hoffner suffered a number of medical problems and
complications, including loss of vision, severe peripheral neuropathy, and
pancreas problems that required a transplant. 7
Hoffner and his wife commenced a medical malpractice action against
Dr. Johnson and Fargo Clinic/MeritCare (collectively "Johnson") on
November 20, 2001.8 In January 2002, Hoffner died at the age of twentyseven from complications related to his misdiagnosed diabetic condition. 9
Johnson asserted that the claims were barred by section 28-01-18(3) of the
North Dakota Century Code, which provides a six-year statute of repose for
medical malpractice actions. 10 Hoffner in turn argued that section 28-0118(3) violated North Dakota's guarantee of equal protection, and should
therefore be found unconstitutional."
On June 7, 2002, the Cass County District Court granted Johnson's
motion for summary judgment, finding section 28-01-18(3) constitutional. 12
The trial court dismissed Hoffner's claim after finding that the applicable
statute of repose barred the action, because it was filed more than six years
from accrual of the claim. 13
Hoffner raised three issues on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court.14 The first and most important issue, the focus of this comment, was
whether section 28-01-18(3) unconstitutionally violated Hoffner's right to
equal protection under the law in North Dakota.'5 The court answered the
question in the negative and affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
section 28-01-18(3) constitutional.16 The other two issues on appeal related
to equitable estoppel and the continuous treatment rule.17 Neither issue was
18
dispositive, and therefore neither will be addressed in this comment.
7. Appellant's Brief at 3-4, Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 660 N.W.2d 909 (No.
20020208).
8. Hoffner, 4, 660 N.W.2d at 911.
9. Appellant's Brief at 4, Hoffner (No. 20020208).
10. Id., see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1991) (providing that medical malpractice
claims must be filed within two years after the claim for relief has accrued, but in no event will
claims be extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice).
11. Appellant's Brief at 19, Hoffner (No. 20020208).
12. Memorandum at 6, Hoffner (No. 09-02-C-0026).
13. Id.
14. Hoffier, 55 1, 24, 30, 660 N.W.2d at 911,917-18.
15. Id. 1 1,660 N.W.2d at 911.
16. Id. 23, 660 N.W.2d at 917.
17. Id. 55 1, 24, 30, 660 N.W.2d at 911, 917-18. The second issue on appeal was whether the
doctrine of equitable estoppel precluded Johnson from relying on the statute of repose as a bar to
Hoffner's claims. Id. 55 24-29, 660 N.W.2d at 917-18. The court answered this issue in the negative as well, finding that Johnson's statements in the letter to Hoffman did not constitute an affirmative deception intended to induce Hoffner to fail to timely commence an action for medical
malpractice. Id. The third issue was whether the continuous treatment rule would act to toll the
statute of repose. Id. 55 30-34, 660 N.W.2d at 918-19. The court declined to adopt the continuous
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
North Dakota law establishes statutes of repose in claims resulting
from defective products19 and for deficiencies in the improvement of real
estate. 20 Additionally, North Dakota, like most states, provides for a statute
of repose regarding medical malpractice claims. 2 1 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has set forth the definition of a statute of repose, 22 as well as
its effects upon a plaintiff's claim. 23 Additionally, the court has ruled on
the constitutionality of the North Dakota statutes of repose for defective
products and improvements to real estate. 24 Other jurisdictions analyzing
the constitutionality of medical malpractice statutes of repose are divided;

some have found the respective state statutes constitutional, while others
have held them unconstitutional on a variety of grounds. 25
A.

DEFINING "STATUTE OF REPOSE"

Statutes of repose "promote a policy of finality in legal relationships,"
and are the subject of legal writing and debate reaching "high levels of
abstraction." 26 A statute of repose by definition differs significantly from
the similar concept of a statute of limitation. 27 Although statutes of repose
treatment rule and found that even if North Dakota recognized the continuous treatment rule, it
would not apply to the facts of the case because Hoffner did not have a continuing physicianpatient relationship with Dr. Johnson. Id.
18. Id. T 1,24, 30, 660 N.W.2d at 911,917-18.
19. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-08 (Supp. 2003) (providing that there may be no
recovery in products liability actions unless the injury or damage occurs within ten years from the
date of initial purchase or eleven years from manufacture).
20. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (1991) (providing that actions for deficiency in design,
planning, supervision or observation of construction of an improvement to real property, or any
injury arising from such deficiency may not be brought more than ten years after substantial
completion of the improvement).
21. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1991) (providing that medical malpractice claims
must be filed within two years after the claim for relief has accrued, but in no event will claims be
extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice).
22. Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 321 (N.D. 1986).
23. Id.
24. See id. (resolving challenge to products liability statute of repose); see also Dickie v.
Farmers Union Oil Co. of LaMoure, 2000 ND 111 7, 611 N.W.2d 168, 171 (answering certified
question regarding constitutionality of revised products liability statute of repose); Bellemare v.
Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733, 739 (N.D. 1988) (resolving challenge to constitutionality of statute of repose for improvements to real estate).
25. Christopher J. Trombetta, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of
Repose: Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 VILL. L. REV. 397 n.4 (1989).
26. Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Products Liability
Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (1980-81).
27. Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 321 (N.D. 1986). A statute of repose is
defined as follows: "A statute that bars a suit a fixed number of years after the defendant acts in
some way... even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered any injury." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999). A statute of limitation on the other hand is defined as: "A
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are conceptually different from statutes of limitation, they have comparable
effects.2 8 Both serve to bar a cause of action; however, the bar of a statute
29
of repose is absolute, and the bar of a statute of limitations is conditional.
A statute of limitation bars a right of action that is not filed within a
specified time after the injury occurs. 30 The limitation period begins when
the injury occurs or when the injury is discovered. 31 A reasonable time after the cause of action arises will be allowed for an injured party to file his
or her lawsuit. 32 The general purpose behind the limitation period is to prevent "plaintiffs from sleeping on their legal rights to the detriment of
defendants." 33
In contrast, a statute of repose "terminates any right of action after a
specified time has elapsed, regardless of whether or not there has as yet
been an injury." 34 The statute of repose period begins to run upon the occurrence of an event. 35 For example, a products liability statute of repose
typically begins running either on the date of purchase, the date of first use,
or when the product leaves the manufacturer's control. 36 Statutes of repose
for improvements to real property usually begin to run on either the date of
substantial completion, the date of acceptance, or the date of the first use of
the improvement. 37 A medical malpractice statute of repose generally begins to run from the date of injury, or the date of the act or omission that
constitutes the alleged malpractice. 38 A person injured after the statutory
39
period of repose is left without a remedy for her injury.

statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim
" Id. at 1422.
accrued ....
28. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 321 (citing Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985)); see generally McGovern, supra note 26, at 592-97 (discussing conceptual differences
between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation).
29. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 (1987).
30. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 321.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Thomas A. Dickson, The Statute of Limitations in North Dakota's Products
Liability Act: An Exercise in Futility?, 59 N.D. L. REV. 551, 556 (1983); State v. Halverson, 285
N.W.292,293 (N.D. 1939)).
34. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 321 (citing Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 16C(2)(i)
(1985)).
35. Id.
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-08 (Supp. 2003); see generally Josephine Herring Hicks,
The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: FederalismReigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627, 629-30
(1985) (discussing time when statute of repose begins to run).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (1991); see generally Hicks, supra note 36, at 629-30
(discussing time when statute of repose begins to run).
38. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1991) (containing North Dakota's medical
malpractice statute of repose); see generally Hicks, supra note 36, at 629-30.
39. Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 321 (N.D. 1986).
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PUTTING IT IN PERSPECTIVE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTES OF REPOSE IN NORTH DAKOTA

The North Dakota Supreme Court used an equal protection analysis to
determine the constitutionality of both the products liability statute of
repose, and the statute of repose for improvements to real property. 40
Analysis under equal protection requires a court to examine the legislature's
purpose in enacting the challenged statute, and to determine whether the
statute creates a distinction between classes of plaintiffs or classes of
defendants.41 Further, courts must articulate the standard by which the
challenged statute's constitutional validity will be determined.4 2 North
Dakota generally follows the United States Supreme Court's three equal
protection standards of review: (1) strict scrutiny, (2) rational basis scrutiny, and (3) intermediate scrutiny.4 3 The North Dakota Supreme Court has
determined that if a challenged statute does not affect a fundamental right or
suspect class, rational basis scrutiny will be applied to statutes affecting
economic or social matters. 44 The intermediate standard is applied to
statutes affecting a plaintiff's right to recover for personal injuries.4 5

40. See id. at 325 (finding statute of repose for products liability unconstitutional); see also
Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733, 739 (N.D. 1988) (upholding statute of
repose for improvements to real property). North Dakota's equal protection clause provides: "[n]o
special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or
repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges
or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." N.D. CONST. art. I,
§21.
41. See Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 326-28 (examining the classification created by statute and
the legislature's goals).
42. See Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 247 (Conn. App. 2001) (noting
requirement that court determine the appropriate standard).
43. See Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974) (discussing standards of
review and similarities to review by the United States Supreme Court). When a statute involves
an "inherently suspect" class or a "fundamental ight," it is subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
To pass constitutional muster, the court must find that the legislation is necessary to further a
compelling state interest. E.g., Golden, 785 A.2d at 247. The rational basis test requires that the
legislative classification be sustained "unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest." Johnson, 217 N.W.2d at 775 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973)). Under the intermediate standard, the court must find a "close
correspondence between [the] statutory classification and [the] legislative goals." Johnson, 217
N.W.2d at 775. The United States Supreme Court limits the use of the intermediate standard to
distinctions based on illegitimacy or gender. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (gender). North Dakota does not limit its
application to those situations, but applies the standard whenever an "important substantive right"
is involved. E.g., Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
44. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d at 775. A statute affecting a fundamental right, or involving an
inherently suspect class is subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
45. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
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Statute of Repose for ProductsLiability

In 1977, the North Dakota Legislature directed the Legislative Council
to study insurance problems in North Dakota, specifically the availability
6
and affordability of products liability insurance.a After receiving considtwo
erable testimony, the Legislative Council recommended the passage 4of
8
bills.47 Together they formed the North Dakota Products Liability Act.
The Products Liability Act provided a statute of repose provision
requiring that an injury giving rise to the claim must have occurred within
ten years of the date of purchase of the defective product, or eleven years
49
from the date of manufacture in order for the action to lie. Testimony received by the legislative committees, as well as the Act itself, indicated that
the limitation period was essential in order to carry out the intent of the bill,
which was to reduce the cost of products liability insurance in North
Dakota.50
In 1986, the constitutionality of the Products Liability Act, specifically
section 28-01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, was determined by
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Hanson v. Williams Co.51 Bonny
Hanson brought an action against the manufacturer of a multi-ton earth
packer, after the packer "jumped backwards" running over and killing her
twenty-two-year-old son. 52 The action was filed eight months after the inci53
dent, but more than twenty years after the earth packer was manufactured.
The trial court dismissed the action after concluding that it was time barred
under section 28-01.1-02.54

46. Id. at 320.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Act was initially codified at N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 28-01.1 (1991 & Supp.
2003). Chapter 28-01.1 was repealed by the legislature in 1993, and the chapter entitled "Products
Liability" is now located at N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 28-01.3 (2003).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (1991). The statute provided that:
There may be no recovery of damages for personal injury, death, or damage to
property caused by a defective product.... unless the injury, death, or damage
occurred within ten years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or
within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product ....
Id.
50. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 320-21; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-01(1), (3) (1991)
(indicating that recent trends of increased products liability claims as well as the increased cost of
products liability insurance necessitated the Products Liability Act to "protect the public interest
by enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
products liability insurance").
51. 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986).
52. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 319-20.
53. Id. at 320.
54. Id. at 319.
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On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court applied its equal protection analysis to Hanson's constitutional challenge of the statute. 55 After
recognizing that an individual's right to recover for personal injuries was an
"important substantive right," 56 the court concluded that the appropriate
standard of review for the constitutional challenge was the intermediate
standard. 57 Additionally, the court identified the classification established
by section 28-01.1-02 as a distinction between persons injured within the
time frame articulated in the statute, and those whose injuries occurred
later. 58 The court recognized the perceived "crisis" facing North Dakota
manufacturers due to unaffordable products liability insurance and the
"importance of legislative action.., to alleviate the problem," but the court
stated that because life and safety were involved, more justification than
merely the economic interests of manufacturers and suppliers must be
advanced for the selection of the repose period.59 Therefore, the court
determined that the classifications created by the statute bore no close
correspondence to the legislature's goal of alleviating the insurance crisis
faced by product manufacturers. 60
Thus, the statute was held
unconstitutional. 6'
After the holding in Hanson, the North Dakota Legislature repealed the
Products Liability Act in 1993.62 A new chapter on products liability was
enacted to replace the Products Liability Act; it contained a repose provision substantially similar to the one held unconstitutional in Hanson.63 In
its declaration of legislative findings and intent, the Legislature expressed,
as the primary purposes for the repose period, a need for clarity and

55. Id. at 323.
56. Id. at 325 (citing Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 326-27.
59. Id. at 328.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 28-01.1 (Supp. 2003) (noting that the chapter was repealed by
S.L. 1993, ch. 324, § 5).
63. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 28-01.3 (Supp. 2003). The repose provision of the updated chapter provides: "there may be no recovery of damages in a products liability action unless the injury,
death, or property damage occurs within ten years of the date of initial purchase for use or
consumption, or within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product." N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-01.3-08 (Supp. 2003).
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predictability 64 and a need to provide a reasonable period of time for the
65
commencement of litigation.
The constitutionality of the 1993 products liability statute of repose
was challenged in Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of LaMoure.66 The
court in Dickie concluded that the appropriate standard of review applicable
to the equal protection analysis was the intermediate standard. 67 Therefore,
the court examined whether there was a close correspondence between the
legislative goals and the classification created by the statute. 68 When comparing Dickie with the decision in Hanson, the court noted that the
legislative goal of the 1993 statute, establishing clarity and predictability,
69
was also articulated as a primary objective of the 1979 statute of repose.
The court noted the lack of testimony and evidence presented to the
legislature that would have demonstrated any harm or prejudice to sellers
and manufacturers if damages were to be imposed for injuries occurring
more than ten years from the initial purchase of their product or eleven
years from its manufacture. 70 Therefore, the court concluded that section
28-01.3-08 could not withstand an equal protection challenge, because no
close correspondence existed between the legislative objectives and the
7
classifications created thereunder. 1
2.

Statute of Repose for Improvements to Real Property

In 1967, the North Dakota Legislature enacted a ten-year statute of
repose regarding claims arising out of a defect in the design, planning,
supervision, or construction of improvements to real property. 72 Although

64. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07(2) (Supp. 2003) (stating that "there is an urgent need
for additional legislation to establish clear and predictable rules with respect to certain matters
relating to products liability actions").
65. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07(3) (stating that the "purpose of [the products liability
repose provision] ... [is] to provide a reasonable period of time for the commencement of
products liability litigation after a manufacturer or seller has parted with possession of its
product").
66. 2000 ND 111,611 N.W.2d 168.
67. Dickie, 5 5, 611 N.W.2d at 170. Lillian Dickie and her husband brought suit against
defendant, who sold, delivered and installed an underground pipe, after the gas leaks in the pipe
caused an explosion that resulted in serious burn injuries to Ms. Dickie. Id. T 2, 611 N.W.2d at
169.
68. Id. 5 5, 611 N.W.2d at 170.
69. Id. 7 7, 611 N.W.2d at 171.
70. id. 55 8-9, 611 N.W.2d at 171-72 (citing Hanson v. Williams, 389 N.W.2d 319, 329
(N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., concurring)).
71. Id. T 9, 611 N.W.2d at 172.
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(1) (1991). Subsection I provides:
No action, whether in contract, oral or written, in tort or otherwise, to recover
damages:
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the legislative history regarding North Dakota Century Code section 28-0144 is limited, it has been determined that the legislature's intention in
enacting the statute was to "limit what would otherwise be virtually
unlimited and perpetual exposure to liability for persons engaged in the
design, planning. .. or construction of improvements to real property." 73
Unlike the legislative intent behind the Products Liability Act, there was no
perceived insurance crisis affecting persons involved in making improvements to real property when section 28-01-44 was enacted. 74
In 1988, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of section 28-01-44 in Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. 75
In Bellemare, the plaintiff's claim had been dismissed as a matter of law,
because the claim had not been brought within the ten-year repose period
provided for in section 28-01-44.76 On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of section 28-01-44 on equal protection grounds. 77
The court again articulated that the right to recover for personal injuries
is an important substantive right.78 Because the statute of repose contained
in section 28-01-44 affected a person's right to recover for personal injuries,
the court applied the intermediate standard of review to its equal protection
analysis. 79 The court also recognized that section 28-01-44 created classification between (a) persons who are entitled to bring claims because their
injuries occurred within ten years from the substantial completion of
improvements to real property, and (b) those whose claims were barred
because their injuries occurred more than ten years after substantial
a. For any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of
construction or construction of an improvement to real property;
b. For injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency; or
c. For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency, may be brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of
such an improvement more than ten years after substantial completion of such an
improvement.
Id.
73. Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, 420 N.W.2d 733, 737 (N.D. 1988). Although the goals
of the legislature in enacting section 28-01-44 were "unstated," the court in Bellemare determined
the legislative intent from decisions in other jurisdictions construing similar statutes. Id. at 738
(citing Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 586 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo. 1978)).
74. Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 737.
75. 420 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1988).
76. Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 734. The plaintiff, Daniel Bellemare, was injured when he fell
from a ladder attached to a grain bin that had been erected by defendant Gateway. Id. Completion of construction of the grain bin occurred in 1967, however the plaintiff's injuries did not
occur until 1979. Id.
77. Id. at 734-35.
78. Id. at 736 (citing Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986)).
79. Id.
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completion of improvements. 80 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard
therefore, the court had to determine whether there was a close correspondence between the classifications and the Legislature's apparent
intention in enacting section 28-01-44.81
The court stated that it could "discern no illegal purpose in the goal of
obtaining finality resulting in financial security and peace of mind by
restricting what would otherwise be virtually unlimited and perpetual
exposure to persons engaged in the.., improvements to real property." 82
The court ultimately concluded that a close correspondence between the
permissible statutory classifications and the permissible legislative goals
83
existed, so therefore, section 28-01-44 was constitutional.
C.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ENACTMENT OF NORTH
DAKOTA'S STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

In 1975, the North Dakota Legislature created section 28-01-18 of the

North Dakota Century Code, which imposed a six-year period of repose on
medical malpractice claims. 84 The language of section 28-01-18(3) currently provides in pertinent part:
The following actions must be commenced within two years after
the claim for relief has accrued:
3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from
malpractice; provided, however, that the limitation of an action
against a physician or licensed hospital will not be extended
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 737-38.
83. Id. at 739. The Court relied upon a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court in
determining that the legislative goals as well as the classification created by section 28-01-44 were
permissible. Id. at 737; see Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 825 (Colo. 1982) (finding goal permissive "[s]ince construction projects generally have expected useful lives of many
years or decades, the possibilities for long-term liability for the professional architect or design
engineer are enormous," and finding classification permissible since "over 99% of claims had
been brought within ten years after completion").
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1991). Initially, the proposed language of the bill
would have imposed a four-year repose period. S.B. 2348, 44th Leg. (N.D. 1975). However, after
testimony and debate in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, the bill was passed with
amendments making the period of repose six years. See generally 1975 Senate Standing Committee Minutes, Hearing on S.B. 2348 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 44th N.D. Legis. Sess.
2-3 (Feb. 5, 1975) [hereinafter Minutes (Feb. 5, 1975)]; 1975 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes, Hearing on S.B. 2348 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 44th N.D. Legis. Sess. 1 (Feb.
10, 1975) [hereinafter Minutes (Feb. 10, 1975)]; 1975 Senate Standing Committee Minutes,
Hearing on S.B. 2348 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 44th N.D. Legis. Sess. 1-4 (Mar. 4,
1975) [hereinafter Minutes (Mar. 4, 1975)].
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beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice by a
nondiscovery thereof unless discovery was prevented by the
fraudulent conduct of the physician or licensed hospital.85
The statute establishes a two-year limitation period for malpractice
claims beginning at the time the cause of action accrues. 86 Subsection three
creates a statue of repose.8 7
Section 28-01-18 does not specifically provide legislative findings
setting forth the purposes of the legislation or the goals of the legislature in
enacting the repose period. 88 However, the goals and purposes behind section 28-01-18 can be found in the testimony and debate in the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees following the introduction of the bill.89 The
legislative history reveals that the legislature's purpose for enacting section
28-01-18 was to alleviate a perceived medical malpractice crisis and to
make the climate more favorable for insurers. 90
This legislation was one of three bills introduced at the same time that
was designed to remedy the rising cost of malpractice insurance for
physicians in North Dakota.91 Testimony in favor of the amendment revealed that the expense and status of malpractice insurance was in a "crisis
situation." 92 Reportedly, at least one company decided to go out of the
malpractice insurance business and others were threatening to do the
same. 93 At least one doctor testified as to the expense of malpractice insurance and the difficulty in obtaining coverage. 94 Additionally, supporters
of the amendment expressed concern that North Dakota's discovery rule

85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18.
86. Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 709 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3). Additionally, as indicated in the statute, exceptions to
repose period are given to infants, the insane and prisoners. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1991).
88. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18.
89. Minutes (Feb. 5, 1975), supra note 84, at 2-3; Minutes (Feb. 10, 1975), supra note 84, at
1; Minutes (Mar. 4, 1975), supra note 84, at 1-4.
90. Minutes (Feb. 5, 1975), supra note 84, at 2-3; Minutes (Feb. 10, 1975), supra note 84, at
1; Minutes (Mar. 4, 1975), supra note 84, at 1-4. Additionally, other portions of the North Dakota
Century Code reflect the medical malpractice insurance crisis. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-1401 (2002) (stating "[t]here is a nationwide crisis in the field of medical malpractice insurance and
physicians practicing medicine within the state of North Dakota are finding, or will find, it
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to obtain medical malpractice insurance").
91. Minutes (Feb. 5, 1975), supra note 84, at 2 (testimony of H.W. Wheeler, Counsel for the
North Dakota Medical Association).
92. Id. at 3 (testimony of J.O. (Bud) Wigen, North Dakota State Insurance Commissioner).
93. Id. (testimony of J.O. (Bud) Wigen, North Dakota State Insurance Commissioner).
94. Minutes (Feb. 10, 1975), supra note 84, at 1 (testimony of Dr. Huntley, North Dakota
Medical Association).
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would allow claims to lie dormant for several years before a patient discovered the injury, thus allowing longer exposure to liability.95
Testimony in opposition to the proposed legislation expressed concern
about putting a limitation on the filing of claims, "because years might go
by before a person even discover[ed] the malpractice and he should still
have some right of recourse if such is the case." 96 Concern was also expressed that too much burden would be placed on the patient, and that
claims would be barred even though they could not have been discovered
97
for fifteen to twenty years.
D.

COMPARING NORTH DAKOTA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
STATUTE OF REPOSE WITH PARALLEL STATUTES OF OTHER
JURISDICTIONS

Historically, various state legislatures enacted statutes of repose in the
early and mid-1970s in response to the adoption of the discovery rule. 98 A
principal reason generally advanced for the enactment of statutes of repose

for medical malpractice claims was the public policy of sheltering healthcare professionals from the burden of potential liability after a reasonable
time had passed. 99 Another justification for statutes of repose was the desire to alleviate insurance problems facing the medical profession.' 00
Twenty-five states currently have statutes similar to North Dakota's
statute of repose for medical malpractice.' 0 ' Each of those state's statutes
95. Minutes (Feb. 5, 1975), supra note 84, at 2 (testimony of H.W. Wheeler, Counsel for the
North Dakota Medical Association). The discovery rule states that a claimant's cause of action
does not accrue until the claimant discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the injury caused by the defendant's negligence. See Anderson v. Shook,
333 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D. 1983) (holding discovery rule was applicable to claims alleging
medical malpractice in North Dakota).
96. Minutes (Feb. 5, 1975), supra note 84, at 3 (testimony of Fred Saefke, Bismarck
Attorney).
97. Minutes (Mar. 4, 1975), supra note 84, at 4 (testimony of Rep. Irving).
98. Trombetta, supra note 25, at 401 n.18.
99. Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 241 (Conn. App. 2001); see also
Sills v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 559 N.W.2d 348 (Mich. App. 1996) (citing Lemmerman v. Fealk,
534 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Mich. 1995)) (stating that the purposes for Michigan's repose period
included security against stale claims and the alleviation of prolonged threats of litigation).
100. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 976-77 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (examining the
social costs of rising medical malpractice insurance premiums); see also Brubaker v. Cavanaugh,
741 F.2d 318, 321 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that Kansas's statute of repose was an attempt by the
legislature to combat the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance); Valentine v. Thomas, 433
So.2d 289, 292 (La. App. 1983) (stating that Louisiana's statute of repose was passed in response
to increases in medical malpractice insurance rates); see generally Hicks, supra note 36, at 632
n.39 (discussing the alleviation of insurance problems as justification for statutes of repose).
101. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a) (1993) (providing action must be commenced within
two years from the date of the act or omission, or if injury could not be discovered within two
years, then action must be filed within six months of discovery; no claim more than four years
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provide: first, a statute of limitation, requiring an action for medical
malpractice be commenced within a prescribed time after discovering the
injury or after the act or omission constituting the malpractice; and, second,
a statute of repose, preventing plaintiffs from bringing claims within a
separate prescribed time after the act or omission, even though the injuries
may have not yet been discovered.1 02 The other twenty-four states require
from the act or omission). The other states with language similar to N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-0118(3) include: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
102. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a) (1993) (providing action must be commenced within two
years from the date of the act or omission, or if injury could not be discovered within two years,
then action must be filed within six months of discovery; no claim more than four years from the
act or omission); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-102.5(1) (West 2002) (providing
claim must be filed within two years after action "accrues"; no claim more than three years from
act/omission); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 1991) (requiring claim within two years
after discovery of the injury; no claim more than three years from act or omission); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 95.1 l(4)(b) (West 2002) (requiring claim within two years from time of incident or two
years from discovery; no claim more than four years from act or omission); HAW. REV. STAT. §
657-7.3 (1993) (requiring claim within two years after discovery; no claim more than six years
from act or omission); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-212(a) (West 1992) (requiring claim
within two years from discovery; no claim more than four years from act or omission); IOWA
CODE § 614.1(9) (1999 & Supp. 2003) (requiring claim within two years from discovery; no claim
more than six years from act or omission); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(7), (c) (1994 & Supp.
2002) (requiring claim within two years from act or omission or two years from discovery; no
claim more than four years from act or omission); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(l)(e), (2)
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 2002) (requiring claim within one year of discovery; no claim more than
five years from act or omission); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628(A) (West 1991 & Supp. 2003)
(requiring claim within one year from discovery; no claim more than three years from act or
omission); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 260 § 4 (West 1992) (requiring claim within three years
from "accrual;" no claim more than seven years from act or omission); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.5805 & 600.5838a(l)(2) (West 2000) (requiring claim within two years from act or
omission or within six months of discovery whichever is later; no claim more than six years from
act or omission); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(2) (2003) (requiring claim within two years from
discovery; no claim more than seven years from act or omission); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2205(l) (2003) (requiring claim within three years from date of injury or three years from
discovery whichever occurs last; no claim more than five years from act or omission); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2828 (1998) (requiring claim within two years from act or omission unless injury
could not be discovered in that time, then one year from date of discovery; no claim more than ten
years from act or omission); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (2002) (requiring claim within two years
from occurrence or if not discovered within two years, then one year from discovery; no claim
more than four years from act or omission); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11.3(A), (C)(1),
(D)(1) (Anderson Supp. 2002) (requiring claim within one year after cause of action "accrues;" no
claim more than four years from act or omission, but if injury is discovered within those four
years, plaintiff may commence action within one year from discovery); OR. REV. STAT. §
12.110(4) (2001) (requiring claim within two years from discovery; no claim more than five years
from act or omission); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (requiring claim
within three years from date of treatment or omission or three years from date of discovery; no
claim more than six years from act or omission); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116(a)(l)-(3) (2000)
(requiring claim within one year from occurrence, but if not discovered in one year, then one year
from discovery; no claim more than three years from act or omission); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-144(1) (2002) (requiring claim within two years from discovery; no claim more than four years from
act or omission); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (Supp. 2001) (requiring claim within three years
from date of incident or two years from date the injury was discovered, whichever occurs later; no
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that the plaintiff's action be commenced within one of four other general
time periods. 03 First, some states require the action to be commenced
within a prescribed time following the act or omission giving rise to the
claim. 0 4 These statutes provide that the claim must be commenced within
a certain time after the cause of action "accrues." 105 Case law in these jurisdictions indicates that an action accrues at the time of the negligent act.106
Although these statutes are generally titled "statutes of limitation," they
function like a statute of repose, as claims will be barred after the expiration
of the applicable time period, even if the patient has not discovered the
07
existence of an injury. 1

Second, some states require an action to be commenced within a
prescribed time following discovery of the injury. 0 8 These statutes
claim more than seven years from act or omission); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.350(3) (West
1998 & Supp. 2003) (requiring claim be filed three years from act or omission or one year from
discovery, whichever period expires later; no claim more than eight years from act or omission);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-4(a) (Michie 2000) (providing claim may be filed within later of two
years from date of injury or two years after discovery; no claim more than ten years from act or
omission); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(l)(a)-(b) (West 1997) (requiring claim within later of three
years from date of injury or one year from date of discovery; no claim more than five years from
act or omission).
103. See generally ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-203(a)-(b) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003)
(providing action must be brought within two years after the date of wrongful act); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.10.070 (Michie 2002) (requiring two years from accrual of action); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
340.5 (West 1982) (providing action must be commenced within three years after the date of
injury, or one year after discovery of the injury, whichever occurs first); Zagaros v. Erickson, 558
N.W.2d 516 (Minn. App. 1997) (interpreting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West 2000 & Supp.
2003) to require commencement of action within two years from time treatment for particular
condition ceases).
104. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-203(a)(b) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003) (providing
action must be brought within two years after the date of wrongful act); see also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-3-71(a) (1998) (requiring two years from act or omission); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-219(4)
(Michie 1998) (requiring two years from act or omission); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-7-1(b) (West
1998) (requiring two years from act or omission); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2902 (West
2000) (requiring three years from act or omission); MO. STAT. ANN. § 516.105 (West 2002)
(requiring two years from occurrence of act of neglect complained of); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507-C:4 (1997) (requiring two years from act or omission); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West
2000) (requiring two years after action "accrues"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (Michie 1996)
(requiring three years from date that act of malpractice occurred); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-214.1 (Michie 2001) (requiring two years after the alleged malpractice); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.003 (West 2002) (requiring two years from "accrual of action"); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-243(A)(2) (Michie 2000) (requiring two years after cause of action "accrues").
105. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (requiring action be
commenced within two years from "accrual of action").
106. See Lamar v. Graham, 598 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (finding discovery rule
inapplicable in Texas, and cause of action accrues at time of negligent act); Smith v. Danek Med.,
Inc., 47 F. Supp.2d 698 (W.D. Va. 1998) (noting Virginia does not follow a discovery rule; statute
of limitations begins to run on the date of injury).
107. See generally Hicks, supra note 36, at 628-31 (discussing differences between and
effects of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose).
108. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (requiring two years from accrual of action); see also
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542(1) (West 2003) (requiring two years after the cause of action
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likewise may provide that the claim must be commenced within a certain
time after the cause of action "accrues." 109 Case law in these jurisdictions
indicates that an action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers the
injury, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury. 110

Third, some states provide that an action must be commenced within a
prescribed time after the date of injury, or a prescribed time after the
discovery of the injury, whichever occurs first.1it These statutes also function like a statute of repose, because they provide an ultimate limitation
beyond which claims will be barred."S2 Finally, at least one state requires
that the action for medical malpractice be commenced within a prescribed
3
time after treatment by the defendant medical provider has ceased."S
Therefore, a clear majority of states currently have statutes that are either
expressly designated as statutes of repose, or function as a statute of repose
by their ability to bar claims before they have accrued. "14

"accrues"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003) (requiring two years from
date plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of the injury); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5524(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 2003) (requiring two years after discovery).
109. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (requiring two years from accrual of action).
110. See, Dalkovski v. Glad, 774 P.2d 202, 206 (Alaska 1989) (finding cause of action in
Alaska accrues, and statute does not begin to run until plaintiff discovers injury); see also Kowske
v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 863 P.2d 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (finding "accrues" for
purposes of statute is defined as the date when plaintiff knew or by exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known of defendant's conduct).
I 1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (providing action must be commenced
within three years after the date of injury, or one year after discovery of the injury, whichever
occurs first); see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 6856(1) (1999) (providing action must be
brought within two years from date of injury, but where injury could not be discovered within
two-year period, then action must be brought within three years from date injury occurred); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 5-109(a) (2002) (providing suit must be filed within the earlier
of five years from injury or three years from discovery of injury); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
41A.097(2) (Michie 2002) (providing action may not be commenced more than three years after
the date of injury or two years after discovery, whichever occurs first); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a
(McKinney 2003) (providing action must be commenced within two years and six months); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1(2) (1997) (providing action must be commenced within three years from
occurrence of the incident, but if the injury could not be discovered at the time of occurrence, then
within three years from the time that the malpractice should have been discovered); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-3-107(a)(i)(A)-(B) (Michie 2003) (providing action shall be brought within the greater
of: two years from date of act or omission; or if claim cannot be discovered within two years, then
must be brought within two years of discovery).
112. See generally Hicks, supra note 36, at 628-31 (discussing differences, between and
effects of, statutes of limitations and statutes of repose).
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). Minnesota's statute
provides that actions must be commenced within two years. Id.; see also Zagaros v. Erickson, 558
N.W.2d 516, 520 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting medical malpractice cause of action generally
accrues when treatment for a particular condition ceases).
114. See generally Hicks, supra note 36, at 628-31 (discussing differences between and
effects of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose).
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTES
OF REPOSE-EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Since the enactment of medical malpractice statutes of repose, plaintiffs in many states have challenged the constitutionality of these statutes on
various grounds. 1' 5 Alleged violations of state or federal equal protection
clauses are the most frequently cited basis for challenging the statute's
constitutionality." 6 However, plaintiffs have cited various other constitutional provisions in alleging that an applicable medical malpractice statute
of repose is unconstitutional."l 7
A plaintiff may challenge a medical malpractice statute of repose on
equal protection grounds by arguing that the statute unconstitutionally
distinguishes between classes of people.11 8 One challenged classification
often cited by plaintiffs involves a distinction between persons with latent
malpractice injuries and persons with injuries that manifest themselves
within the statutory time period.'l9 Additionally, plaintiffs often challenge
the distinction between persons whose injuries fall within one of the
statutory exceptions and those whose injuries do not. 120
When a medical malpractice statute of repose is challenged on equal
protection grounds, the reviewing court must first determine the standard by
which the challenged statute's constitutional validity will be determined.12 1
State courts, regardless of whether the plaintiff is challenging a state or

115. See generally Trombetta, supra note 25, at 407-12 (discussing various constitutional
challenges to medical malpractice statutes of repose).
116. See, e.g., Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982) (resolving challenge to medical malpractice statute of repose on equal protection grounds).
117. See, e.g., Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 247-48 (Conn. App.
2001) (resolving challenge on equal protection grounds); see also Montagino v. Canale, 792 F.2d
554, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1986) (resolving challenge on due process grounds); Whigham v. Shands
Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 613 So.2d 110, 112-13 (Fla. App. 1993) (resolving challenge to
open courts provision); Kanne v. Bulkley, 715 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ill. App. 1999) (resolving
challenge to special laws provision). See generally Trombetta, supra note 25, at 407-41 (discussing constitutional challenges to medical malpractice statutes of repose on grounds other than
equal protection).
118. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 48 (Colo. 1984) (resolving equal protection
challenge that allowed exception to the statute of repose for claimants who had foreign objects left
in their bodies). Some states provide exceptions to the relevant statute of repose, which gives injured persons additional time to bring a claim. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (2001)
(providing exception for fraud, deceit or misleading representation); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.1 1(4)(b) (West 2002) (providing exception for action brought on behalf of minor); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-212(c) (West 1992) (providing exception for persons under a "legal
disability"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(2)(a) (2003) (providing exception for foreign objects left
in patient's body).
121. Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 247 (Conn. App. 2001).
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federal constitutional provision, utilize one of three standards articulated by
22
the United States Supreme Court.
1.

Analysis UnderRational Basis Scrutiny

The rational relationship test, which is the "most relaxed and tolerant
form of judicial scrutiny,"' 23 is used in equal protection analysis most
frequently, because most courts find that the classifications created by a
medical malpractice statute of repose do not impinge upon an inherently
suspect class or affect a fundamental personal right.124 The right to recover
for personal injuries has not been regarded by the courts as a fundamental
right.125 In the absence of a suspect classification or a fundamental right,
courts will not second-guess the legislature's wisdom or the necessity for
legislation.126 Courts will uphold a medical malpractice statute of repose
challenged on equal protection grounds under the rational basis test if it
determines that there is "a rational relationship between the classification
and some legitimate governmental purpose."1 27
The majority of courts that have analyzed the constitutionality of their
respective medical malpractice statute of repose have employed the rational
basis standard of review.1 28 Most courts recognize that statutes of repose
may have the harsh effect of barring plaintiffs from bringing claims because
their injuries are latent and could not be discovered prior to the expiration

122. See, e.g., id. (applying rational basis scrutiny); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831
(N.H. 1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny); Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (Ariz. 1984)
(applying strict scrutiny).
123. DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 960 P.2d 919, 923 (Wash. 1998).
124. Golden, 785 A.2d at 247. Suspect classifications include distinctions made on the basis
of race, national origin, religion, or status as a resident alien. Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc. of
N.M., 918 P.2d 1321, 1328 (N.M. 1996). A right is fundamental if it is explicitly, or implicitly,
guaranteed by the constitution. Id. These rights include "amendment rights, freedom of association, voting, interstate travel, privacy, and fairness in the deprivation of life, liberty or property."
Id.
125. Golden, 785 A.2d at 247; see Valentine v. Thomas, 433 So.2d 289, 292 (La. App. 1983)
(noting that the right to recover in tort is not a fundamental right); Cummings, 918 P.2d at 1332
(stating that malpractice claim is attempt to possess something the patient does not yet possess,
and as such, a malpractice claim does not implicate any fundamental right).
126. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 933 (N.H. 1980). North Dakota recognizes the wellestablished principle that an enactment by the legislature is presumed to be valid. Hanson v.
Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 324 (N.D. 1986). Courts should exercise their power to declare a
statute unconstitutional with caution. Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 248
(Conn. App. 2001).
127. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1984).
128. Brubaker, 741 F.2d at 321; Golden, 785 A.2d at 247; Valentine, 433 So.2d at 293; Sills
v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 559 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Mich. App. 1996); Hoffman v. Powell, 380 S.E.2d
821, 822 (S.C. 1989).
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of the repose period. 29 However, the courts also recognize the state's legitimate interest in enacting statutes designed to cut off claims, even before
they can be discovered. 30 Statutes that were enacted with the legislative
purpose of barring stale claims have been found rationally related to the
classifications created by the statute between persons whose injuries are
latent and those whose injuries are discovered within the repose period.131
Likewise, where the legislative purpose of the statute was to alleviate the
insurance crisis facing the medical profession, thereby lowering healthcare
costs, courts have found the purposes to be rationally related to the classifications created by the statute.1 32 Under the relaxed standard of rational
basis, the majority of courts faced with the issue have found the relevant
medical malpractice statute of repose to be constitutional. 133
At least one court, however, found that although the legislature's goals
in enacting the statute of repose were legitimate, the relationship between
the goal of alleviating a perceived medical insurance crisis and the class of
persons affected by the statute was too attenuated to survive even rational
basis scrutiny.1 34 In DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center,135 the statute

of repose provided that claims must be commenced within three years of
the act or omission giving rise to the claim or within one year of discovering the injury, but in no event was a claim allowed more than eight
years after the act or omission. 136 The Washington Supreme Court

129. See Burris v. Ikard, 798 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tenn. App. 1990) (recognizing harshness of
result of barring plaintiffs' right to seek redress before they even know about the injury).
130. See Golden, 785 A.2d at 244 (stating that "[s]tatutes of repose are constitutional
enactments that involve a balancing of the hardship caused by the potential bar of a just claim with
the advantage of barring stale claims").
131. See id. at 248 (finding rational relationship between goal of barring stale claims and the
repose provision); see also Craven v. Lowndes County Med. Auth., 437 S.E.2d 308, 309-10 (Ga.
1993) (holding that a statute that functions like statute of repose by having potential of barring
claims before they are discovered is rationally related to legislature's goal of eliminating stale
claims).
132. See Valentine v. Thomas, 433 So.2d 289, 292 (La. App. 1983) (finding classification
rationally related to the state objective of responding to increasing malpractice insurance rates and
reducing cost of healthcare); see also Burris, 798 S.W.2d at 250 (giving deference to legislature's
enactment of statute and goal of reducing insurance costs).
133. See DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 960 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Wash. 1998) (utilizing a
rational basis standard, and noting that "clear majority of courts have upheld such statutes"). The
following cases employed the rational basis standard and upheld the relevant medical malpractice
statute of repose against an equal protection constitutional attack. See Brubaker v. Cavanaugh,
741 F.2d 318, 322 (10th Cir. 1984); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982);
Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 248 (Conn. App. 2001); Craven, 437 S.E.2d
at 310; Valentine, 433 So.2d at 293; Sills, 559 N.W.2d at 353; Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of
N.M., 918 P.2d 1321, 1333 (N.M. 1996).
134. DeYoung, 960 P.2d at 925.
135. 960 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1998).
136. DeYoung, 960 P.2d at 921.
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acknowledged that the statute had been enacted in response to a perceived
insurance crisis. 137 The court did not challenge the legitimacy of the legislature's purposes in enacting the statute of repose. 38 However, the court
had difficulty with the legislation's lack of a showing that an eight-year
repose period would have any chance of stabilizing the perceived insurance
crisis in Washington.139 Reports presented to the legislature in consideration of the statute revealed that less than one percent of malpractice
claims prior to the statute were made eight years or more after the incident
of malpractice. 40 The court found the relationship to be too attenuated between the legislative goal and the class of persons affected.41 The court
concluded that since the statute affected so few claimants, the repose period
could not avert or resolve the insurance crisis.142 Therefore, the statute was
held unconstitutional. 143
2.

Analysis Under IntermediateScrutiny

Although rational basis is the most common standard for analyzing
challenges to medical malpractice statutes of repose, some courts have
found the intermediate standard appropriate in resolving equal protection
challenges.144 The intermediate standard requires a "close correspondence
between statutory classification and legislative goals."145 For a statute to be
held constitutional, the court must determine that the challenged classifications are reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation.14 6

137. See id. at 924 (noting that legislative history revealed that "[b]y enacting [a]... statute
of repose, the Legislature intended to protect insurance companies while 'hopefully not resulting
in too many individuals not getting compensated').
138. See id. at 926 (stating the goal is legitimate).
139. Id. at 925.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 926.
143. Id. Although the Washington court held that the statute violated the "privileges and
immunities clause," this constitutional provision is equivalent to the equal protection clauses in
most states. Id. The Washington privileges and immunities clause, provides that "'[n]o law shall
be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges
or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations."' Id. at 921 (citing WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12).
144. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (N.H. 1980) (applying intermediate
scrutiny).
145. Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 323 (N.D. 1986) (citing Johnson v. Hassett,
217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974)).
146. Carson, 424 A.2d at 831.
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In Carson v. Maurer,147 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of
certain provisions of New Hampshire's medical malpractice statute, including the provision creating a two-year "statute of limitation."'' 48 The
court recognized that the statute impinged on a person's right to recover for
personal injuries.149 Although the court determined that "the right to recover for personal injuries [was] not a fundamental right," it held that the
right "[was] nevertheless an important substantive right."50 Therefore, the
court concluded that the rights involved were sufficiently important to
require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be subjected to a more
rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test. 151
Using a heightened level of scrutiny, the court concluded that the statute
unreasonably distinguished between persons whose claims fell within one
of the statutory exceptions, and those whose claims did not. 152 Therefore,
the court held the statute unconstitutional, determining that the legislature
could not deny claims to one class of people while allowing claims for
others, in pursuit of the legislative goal of providing effective healthcare at
153
a reasonable cost.
North Dakota has followed the jurisprudence of New Hampshire,
holding that the intermediate standard of review is appropriate when re54
solving a challenge to a statute of repose on equal protection grounds.
The rational basis test is most often applied in North Dakota cases involving economic and social matters. 155 Although there are some economic
consequences behind statutes of repose, North Dakota has taken the

147. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
148. Carson, 424 A.2d at 829. Although the court referred to the challenged provision as a
"statute of limitation," the function of the provision is as a statute of repose. Id. The statute "requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff bring his action within two years of the alleged
negligence" absent exceptions for claims based on the discovery of foreign objects in the body and
claims by minors. Id. at 833. The statute therefore bars claims by plaintiffs who do not fall within
one of the exceptions, and whose injuries are undiscoverable before the expiration of the two-year
period. Id.
149. Id. at 830.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court only applies intermediate scrutiny to cases involving gender and illegitimacy, and not to cases like this one
involving the right to recover for personal injuries. Id. at 831. However, the court stated that they
were allowed to grant more rights under the state constitution than are required under the federal
constitution. Id.
152. Id. at 833.
153. Id. The court discussed the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. Id. at 831.
154. See Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986) (applying the intermediate standard to challenge to products liability statute of repose); see also Bellemare v. Gateway
Builders, 420 N.W.2d 733, 736 (N.D. 1988) (applying intermediate standard to challenge to
statute of repose for improvements to real property).
155. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
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position that the focus must be on the individuals affected by the statute, as
"human life and safety [cannot be regarded] as simply a matter of economics."1 56 North Dakota has determined that the right to recover for
personal injuries is an important substantive right.157 Therefore, North
Dakota utilizes the heightened intermediate standard when a challenged
statute involves the right to recover for personal injuries, including
challenges to statutes of repose. 58
3.

Analysis Under Strict JudicialScrutiny

Most courts agree that the third standard of review, strict scrutiny, is
inapplicable to an equal protection analysis of a challenged statute of
repose, because most courts find that the classifications created by medical
malpractice statutes of repose do not impinge upon an inherently suspect
class or affect a fundamental personal right.159 Strict scrutiny analysis requires that a statutory classification must be necessary to serve a compelling
state interest. 160 However, the Arizona Supreme Court in Kenyon v.
Hammer1 61 applied strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to a
medical malpractice statute of repose. 62 The court determined that the
right to recover for personal injuries was guaranteed by a state constitutional provision, and therefore, was a "fundamental" right requiring any
statute that infringed on that right to be examined under strict scrutiny. 163
The challenged Arizona statute provided that an action for medical
malpractice was barred if not commenced within three years from the date
of injury.164 The court in Kenyon recognized that the Arizona medical malpractice statute was enacted in response to a perceived malpractice crisis. 65

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983)).
159. Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 247 (Conn. App. 2001); see also
Valentine v. Thomas, 433 So.2d 289, 292 (La. App. 1983) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny and
noting that the right to recover in tort is not a fundamental right); Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of
N.M., 918 P.2d 1321,1332 (N.M. 1996) (stating strict scrutiny was inappropriate, as a malpractice
claim does not implicate any fundamental right).
160. See Golden, 785 A.2d at 247 (stating that under strict scrutiny, the defendant has burden
of demonstrating that repose section "is necessary to advance a compelling state interest").
161. 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984).
162. Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 975.
163. Id. The court held that the right to pursue the medical malpractice action was a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Arizona constitution. Id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. Art. 18, § 6).
That constitutional provision provides: "The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." Id.
at 966 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. Art. 18, § 6).
164. Id. at 964.
165. Id.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:175

The court did not find the state's interest in providing economic relief to
one segment of society to be a compelling interest. 166 The court noted that
if the state also had an interest in providing quality healthcare at a reasonable price, the goal of reducing insurance rates might be considered
compelling. 167

The court also recognized that the statute created several classifications, including a distinction between plaintiffs whose injures fell within
one of the statutory exceptions, which would allow them to bring claims
upon discovery of the injury, and those whose injuries did not fall within an
exception.168 Noting the lack of statistical evidence, the court found this
classification was not a necessary step to achieve the goal of reducing the
cost and/or availability of healthcare.169 The court held that even assuming
the existence of a compelling interest, the classification created by the
statute was not necessary to further that interest.1 70 Therefore, Arizona's
medical malpractice statute of repose was held to violate equal protection,
and was therefore unconstitutional.171
III. ANALYSIS
Hoffner was decided by a three-to-two majority.172 The court held that
North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-18(3) was constitutional, even
though its effect was to foreclose a cause of action to a plaintiff before his
injuries had been discovered. 73 Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Sandstrom and Schmalenberger, District
Judge joined.174 Justice Maring dissented, and Justice Neumann concurred
in the dissent. 75

166. Id. at 976.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 968-69. The Arizona medical malpractice statute provided that if the claim was
based on a foreign object left in the body, the claim would be tolled until the object was
discovered. Id. at 969. Additionally, plaintiffs would be allowed to file claims upon discovering
the injury, if it was concealed or misrepresented, or where the plaintiff was a minor. Id.
169. Id. at 979.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, % 36, 52, 660 N.W.2d 909, 919, 926.
173. Id. 5 23, 660 N.W.2d 909, 917.
174. Id. %J1, 36, 660 N.W.2d at 911, 919. The Honorable Alan L. Schmalenberger, District
Judge sat in place of Justice Kapsner who was disqualified. Id. T 37, 660 N.W.2d at 920.
175. Id.55 38, 52, 660 N.W.2d at 920, 926.
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THE MAJORITY OPINION

The majority began its analysis of the constitutionality of section 2801-18 by first examining whether subsection three created a statute of limitation or a statute of repose.' 76 The court analyzed its previous decision in
Hanson, which made a distinction between a statute of repose and a statute
of limitation.1 77 The first portion of section 28-01-18(3), which provides
that actions for malpractice must be commenced within two years, was
deemed a statute of limitation.1 78 Because the six-year period under section
28-01-18(3) begins to run when the negligent act or omission occurs, the
court determined that this portion was a statute of repose. 79
In holding this provision a statute of repose, the court recognized that
the occurrence of the negligent act or omission and the injury were not
always concurrent, and this case provided an example of that.180 The court
held that Dr. Johnson's letter to Hoffman constituted the negligent act, and
began the running of the statute. 181 However, the court acknowledged that
the exact date of Hoffner's "injury" was unknown, and could have occurred
sometime after he had received the letter. 8 2 The majority concluded that
the negligent act in this case was not concurrent with Hoffner's injuries, but
that the statute had begun running even before Hoffner discovered he had
been injured. 183
The court then examined Hoffner's claim that section 28-01-18(3)
violated the equal protection clause' 84 by creating an unconstitutional classification between "plaintiffs whose injuries were discoverable within six
years of the negligent act or omission," and those whose injuries did not
manifest themselves within six years. 8 5 The court noted the effect of the

176. Id. 5 9, 660 N.W.2d at 913-14.
177. Id. (citing Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 321 (N.D. 1986)).
178. Id. 10, 660 N.W.2d at 914.
179. Id. 55 1, 13, 660 N.W.2d at 914-15. The court also noted that other jurisdictions
construe similar statutes as statutes of repose. Id. 5 12, 660 N.W.2d at 914 (citing Siler v. Block,
420 S.E.2d 306, 307 (Ga. App. 1992); Ferrara v. Wall, 753 N.E.2d 1179, 1181 (Il. App. 2001);
Sills v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 559 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Mich. App. 1996); Garcia ex rel. Garcia v.
LaFarge, 893 P.2d 428, 433 (N.M. 1995)).
180. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 5 11, 660 N.W.2d 909, 914.
181. Id. 7,660 N.W.2d at 913.
182. Id. 11,660 N.W.2d at 914.
183. Id.
184. Id. 14, 660 N.W.2d at 915. The opinion does not specify whether Hoffner challenged
the constitutionality of the North Dakota Constitution or the Federal Constitution, as it does not
cite to the provision referred to as "equal protection clause." Id. However, in reviewing Appellant's Brief, it is evident that Hoffner's challenge was to North Dakota's constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. See Appellant's Brief at 19, 21, Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 660
N.W.2d 909 (No. 20020208).
185. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 5 14, 660 N.W.2d 909, 915.
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classification was to allow claims by plaintiffs whose injuries were discoverable, while barring malpractice claims by plaintiffs whose injuries
were not. 186 The court determined that the challenged statute, affecting the
plaintiff's ability to recover for personal injuries, involved an important
substantive right.187 Therefore, the court held that an intermediate standard
88
of review was appropriate in assessing the statute's constitutionality.1 The
intermediate standard in North Dakota requires "a close correspondence
between the statutory classification and the legislative goals."189 Because
the court had already identified the classification created by the statute, its
focus turned to determining the legislature's goals in enacting section 2801-18(3).190

The majority noted that in an equal protection analysis, the court "may
consider unarticulated as well as articulated legislative purposes and
goals."191 Accordingly, the court examined the legislative history of the
statute for its articulated goals. 192 The court also examined prior decisions
to find unarticulated goals for the enactment of the statute of repose.193 The
legislative history, particularly the testimony presented to the legislature
during debates over the proposed statute of repose, indicated a concern with
a perceived insurance crisis. 194 This articulated legislative purpose is nearly
identical to the articulated purpose behind the products liability statute of
repose, analyzed by the court in Hanson.195 The court found that the legislature in enacting section 28-01-18(3) did so with a second purpose of
restricting what would otherwise be virtually unlimited and perpetual
exposure to liability for medical providers.1 96 The court held that this
second purpose was not articulated in the legislative history, but instead
was found by the court to be a general purpose of a statute of repose, as
97
articulated previously in Bellemare.1
The court additionally examined Hoffner's argument that the court's
decision should be controlled by the previous decision in Hanson, because
the legislative purpose for the medical malpractice statute of repose was

186. Id.
187. Id. T15.
188. Id.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. IT 15-20, 660 N.W.2d at 915-16.
Id. 1 15,660 N.W.2d at 915.
Id.
Id. TS 15-20, 660 N.W.2d at 915-16.
Id. J 17,660 N.W.2d at 915-16.
Id.
Id. 18, 660 N.W.2d at 916.
Id. (citing Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, 420 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1988)).
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similar to the purpose for the products liability statute of repose.198 The
court also examined Johnson's opposing argument that the court's decision
should be guided by its previous decision in Bellemare, in which the court
upheld a statute of repose for actions involving improvements to real property.199 Because there were conflicting arguments regarding which line of
authority controlled the issue, the court attempted to resolve the differences
and similarities between its prior jurisprudence in Hanson and Bellemare in
200

Hoffner.
In comparing the Hanson decision with the present case, the court
found that there were "important distinctions" between the two cases.2 0 1
The first distinction was the North Dakota State Insurance Commissioner's
reception of the proposed products liability statute compared with his
reception of the medical malpractice statute of repose. 202 Testimony before
the legislature revealed that the Commissioner had opposed the products
liability statute of repose, yet he had supported the medical malpractice
statute of repose. 203 A second distinction the court made was to the substance and subject matter upon which products liability and medical
malpractice claims are based.204 The court noted that defective products
"normally have a limited useful life," while "a person [who has been
injured by the malpractice of a medical provider] may live for years or
decades before an act of medical malpractice manifests itself."205 The court
reasoned that a person's potential for longevity raised "the possibility of
'long-term liability' for the physician or hospital" more so than does the

198. Id. T 16, 660 N.W.2d at 915. In Hanson, the court held the statute of repose for
products liability actions violated equal protection because there was no close correspondence
between the goal of alleviating the perceived insurance crisis, and the requirement that claims be
brought within the specified time period. Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D.
1986).
199. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, T 16, 660 N.W.2d 909, 915. The Bellemare court
found that the legislative purpose of obtaining finality to potential claims closely corresponded to
the classification that allowed claims brought within the statutory time period while barring those
occurring or discovered after the expiration of the prescribed time. Bellemare v. Gateway
Builders, 420 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 (N.D. 1988).
200. Hoffner, 55 16-20, 660 N.W.2d at 915-16.
201. Id. T 17,660 N.W.2d at 915.
202. Id. at 915-16.
203. Id. The court indicated that the Insurance Commissioner opposed the products liability
bill, specifically testifying that "the statute of repose would not alleviate the problem of increasing
insurance premiums for manufacturers in the state." Id. at 915. By contrast, "the Insurance Commissioner supported enactment of the medical malpractice statute of repose, testifying that there
was a crisis situation, that insurers were discontinuing writing malpractice coverage, that claims
paid were exceeding premiums collected, and that new doctors were unable to purchase
malpractice insurance." Id. at 915-16.
204. Id. 55 19, 20, 660 N.W.2d at 916.
205. Id.
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potential for long-term liability for defective products. 206 Likewise, in reviewing it's previous decision in Bellemare, the court determined that
similarities existed between that case and the case presently before it.207
The court concluded its previous assumption about the legislature's
purpose for the statute of repose for improvements to real property could be
assumed about the legislature's purpose in enacting the medical malpractice
statute. 208 Additionally, the court likened a person's potential longevity to
the virtually unlimited exposure to liability faced by physicians to the
potential for unlimited exposure to liability faced by persons involved with
improvements to real estate. 209
The court relied on the unarticulated goal of the need to create reasonable limits on the legal consequences of a wrong, and it held that a close
correspondence existed between that goal and the classification created by
the six-year medical malpractice statute of repose. 2 10 Although the court
acknowledged the similarities in the stated legislative goals of the medical
malpractice statute of repose and the statute at issue in Hanson, the court
simply pushed those similarities aside and focused on the stated differences:
that the Insurance Commissioner spoke in favor of one and not the other;
and that a person has a potential for longevity while defective products
normally have a limited life.211 Therefore, the court found that North
Dakota Century Code section 28-01-18(3) was constitutional, and did not
212
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
B.

JUSTICE MARING'S DISSENT

Justice Maring dissented for two reasons. 2 13 First, she argued that the
majority incorrectly determined that unarticulated legislative goals should
be considered in assessing the constitutionality of statutory classifications

206. Id.

20.

207. Id.

18.

208. Id. 5 18-20.
209. Id.$ 20.
210. Id. $$ 22, 23, 660 N.W.2d at 917.
211. Id.
17, 19, 20, 660 N.W.2d at 915-16.
212. Id. 23, 660 N.W.2d at 917. In holding the statute constitutional, the court noted that
other jurisdictions have found similar statutes constitutional. Id. (citing Bmbaker v. Cavanaugh,
741 F.2d 318, 321-22 (10th Cir. 1984); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982);
Golden v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 785 A.2d 234, 246-48 (Conn. App. 2001); Craven v.
Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 437 S.E.2d 308, 309-10 (Ga. 1993); Valentine v. Thomas, 433
So.2d 289, 292-93 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Sills v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 559 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1996); Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., 918 P.2d 1321, 1331-33 (N.M. 1996);
Hoffman v. Powell, 380 S.E.2d 821, 822 (S.C. 1989); Burris v. Ikard, 798 S.W.2d 246, 249-50
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).
213. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79,1 38,660 N.W.2d 909, 920 (Maring, J., dissenting).
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under an equal protection analysis when applying the intermediate standard. 214 Second, she argued that Hanson correctly applied the intermediate
standard by examining only the articulated legislative goals. 21 5 Justice
Maring argued that because Hoffner was more like Hanson, the court
should have questioned the close correspondence between the legislative
goal and the statutory classification. 216 Justice Maring concluded that
section 28-01-18(3) was unconstitutional. 217
Justice Maring argued that because the majority relied on unarticulated
goals, it had in effect applied a rational basis standard of review rather than
the professed intermediate standard.218 The United States Supreme Court,
when applying the intermediate standard, requires defendants to present a
genuine justification for the challenged statute. 219 The justification cannot
be "hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." 220 Justice
Maring stated that in Hoffner, the testimony before the legislature in
contemplation of the medical malpractice statute of repose made it "crystal
clear" that the purpose was to "remedy the rising cost of malpractice
insurance." 22 1 She argued that the majority, apparently recognizing the
weakness of this goal pursuant to the holding in Hanson, incorrectly professed to have the authority to rely on an unarticulated goal to find the
statute constitutional. 222
Justice Maring concluded that by applying the intermediate standard
and relying on the articulated goals, the court's decisions in Hanson and
Dickie provide the correct application of the standard, and should have been
relied on by the majority. 223 Justice Maring determined that the case was
"devoid of any showing" that claims brought by persons whose injuries
were discovered more than six years from the initial act or omission of the
alleged malpractice, as compared to persons injured within that time frame,

214. Id. 5 39.
215. Id. 5 43, 660 N.W.2d at 921.
216. Id. 5 46, 660 N.W.2d at 924.
217. Id. 5 51, 660 N.W.2d at 926.
218. Id. 5 41, 660 N.W.2d at 921. Justice Maring acknowledged that the court may consider
unarticulated goals, but concluded that the court may do so only under the more relaxed rational
basis standard. Id. She further argued that the court should no longer use the intermediate
standard if it is going to rely on unarticulated goals, since the standard is really masquerading as
rational basis. Id.
219. Id. T 42, 660 N.W.2d at 921 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996)).
220. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)) (emphasis in original).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. 5 43, 660 N.W.2d at 921-22. Justice Maring states at the beginning of the dissent that
she too would apply the intermediate standard. Id. 5 38, 660 N.W.2d at 920.
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has "caused inequity, unfairness, or unreasonable exposure and unpredictability."224 Justice Maring concluded that the majority's reliance on the
Insurance Commissioner's support of the medical malpractice statute
missed the point.225 Justice Maring concluded that no close correspondence
existed between the statutory classification and the articulated legislative
goals. 226
Finally, Justice Maring was similarly unimpressed with the majority's
simulation between the longevity of human life, and the longer life of an
improvement to real property as opposed to that of a defective product. 227
She argued that while persons involved with the improvements to real
property generally do not maintain continuing control over the improvement after construction, manufacturers are charged with maintaining
high quality control standards.228 Based on the degree of control and quality expected of the classes of defendants, Justice Maring disagreed with the
majority's placement of physicians in the same category as architects who
design improvements to real property. 229
Justice Maring concluded that the court's analysis in Hanson was
correct, and that the majority should have required some rational basis other
than the economic interests of insurance companies to be advanced for the
selection of the time period in the medical malpractice statute of repose. 230
Justice Maring concluded there was no close correspondence between the
legislative goals and the statutory classifications. 23 1 Therefore, Justice
Maring would have concluded that section 28-01-18(3) was unconstitutional. 232
IV. IMPACT
The most obvious consequence of the court's decision in Hoffner is the
definitive determination that medical malpractice claims in North Dakota
will be barred after six years from the date of the malpractice, even if the
injuries are latent and the plaintiff has not yet discovered their existence. 233
By holding section 28-18-01 to be constitutional, the court has determined

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

ld. J44,
Id. T 47,
Id. 5 44,
Id. 5 48,
Id.
Id.
Id. 5 51,
Id.
Id.
Id. T 23,

660
660
660
660

N.W.2d
N.W.2d
N.W.2d
N.W.2d

at 923.
at 924.
at 923.
at 924-25.

660 N.W.2d at 926.

660 N.W.2d at 917.
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that the interests of alleviating rising insurance costs and providing finality
to potential claims outweighs the harsh effects placed on innocent
victims. 234
The insurance crisis of 1975 appears to continue today. 235 The cost of
medical malpractice insurance continues to rise, with medical providers
around the nation faced with rates that have doubled or tripled from
previous years. 236 The St. Paul Companies, a large provider in the medical
malpractice insurance market in North Dakota, recently announced that it is
getting out of providing medical malpractice coverage due to heavy losses,
despite increased rates. 237 The effect of these developments in North
Dakota is unknown at this time. 238 It seems evident, however, that patients
will ultimately bear this burden by being left without remedies for latent
injuries that were undiscoverable within six years. 239
Aside from barring potential claims, the holding in Hoffner created
obvious inconsistencies with the court's prior jurisprudence in Hanson and
Bellemare.240 In the realm of products liability, the court had determined
that legislation with the purpose of alleviating an insurance crisis, absent
evidence that the purpose closely corresponds to eliminating claims of persons injured after the statutory period, was unconstitutional. 24' Faced with
the same legislative purpose and the same effect of barring claims in the
medical malpractice context, the court determined that a statute of repose
for medical malpractice was constitutional. 242 The court avoided these correlations by relying instead on goals that the North Dakota legislature gave
no indication it possessed at the time it passed the medical malpractice
statute of repose. 243 The court's reasoning, that the long life of a human

234. See id. 55 17-18, 660 N.W.2d at 915-16 (discussing legislative goals); see also Burris v.
Ikard, 798 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tenn. App. 1990) (recognizing harshness of result of barring
plaintiffs' right to seek redress before they even know about the injury).
235. NGA Center for Best Practices, Issue Brief: Addressing the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crisis, at 1, available at http://www.nga.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
236. Id.
237. id. at 2; see also Brief of Appellees at 22, Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 660
N.W.2d 909 (No. 20020208).
238. Appellees' Brief at 22, Hoffner (No. 20020208).
239. See Burris, 798 S.W.2d at 250 (noting harsh effect); see also Minutes (Mar. 4, 1975),
supra note 84, at 4 (testimony of Rep. Irving expressing concern with placing burden of
malpractice damages on patient).
240. See generally Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319, 325-28 (N.D. 1986) (holding
products liability statute of repose unconstitutional); Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, 420 N.W.2d
733, 736-38 (N.D. 1988) (upholding statute of limitation for improvements to real estate).
241. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 328.
242. Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79 5 23, 660 N.W.2d 909, 917.
243. See id. l 18, 660 N.W.2d at 916 (relying on legislative goals inferred previously by the
court).
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being is analogous with the long life of real property to justify the need to
limit long term liability, is at best weak. 244 In the future it is quite likely
that the court will find itself resolving these inconsistencies.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hoffner, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of North Dakota's medical malpractice statute of repose, section
28-01-18 of the North Dakota Century Code.245 The plaintiff in Hoffner
alleged that the medical malpractice statute of repose violated his constitutional right to equal protection. 246 In upholding the constitutionality of
section 28-01-18, the court determined that even though a plaintiff's injuries may not be apparent and discoverable, any claim for damage based
on those injuries was barred if not brought within six years from the date of
247
the act or omission constituting the alleged malpractice.
Tracy J. Lyson

244. Id. 20, 660 N.W.2d at 916. The court made this correlation in an attempt to relate the
Hoffner case to the holding in Bellemare that the statute of repose was constitutional. Id. (citing
Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 321; Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 733).
245. Hoffner, 23, 660 N.W.2d at 917.
246. See id. (holding no violation of equal protection clause); see also Appellant's Brief at
19, 21, Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 660 N.W.2d 909 (No. 20020208) (citing North Dakota
equal protection clause as basis for appeal).
247. Hoffner, 23, 660 N.W.2d at 917.

